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(Mock-)Thinking about the Same  
ALBERTO VOLTOLINI1 
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of inten-
tional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even 
if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this 
problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely 
that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one 
rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are constituted either by what 
they are about, their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition-like 
intentional contents, one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different 
way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on two factors: a) 
what sort of metaphysical nature intentional objects effectively possess, once they are 
conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001, 2013); b) whether such objects really 
belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is. According to this solution, 
two thoughts are about the same nonexistent intentional object iff i) that object satisfies 
the identity criterion for objects of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind 
belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is, independently of whether 
they exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither 
realist nor antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about 
the same nonexistent intentionale; otherwise, they are simply constituted by the same 
intentional content (provided that this content is not equated with that intentionale). 
Third, armed with this solution, I will hold that one can find a suitable treatment of the 
specific and related problem of whether different people may mock-think about the 
same thing, even if there really is no such thing. Finally, I will try to show that this 
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treatment can be also applied to the case in which different thoughts are, according to 
phenomenology, about the same intentionale and yet this intentionale is of a kind such 
that there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are about the 
same intentionale only fictionally. 
KEYWORDS: Intentional identity – intentional objects – intentional contents – schematic 
objects. 
1. Introduction 
 In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of 
intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the 
same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that 
antirealist approaches to this problem, according to which there is no such 
thing and yet there is a legitimate sense in which the relevant thoughts are 
about the same thing, are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a prob-
lematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves iden-
tifying it. Second, I will claim that once one rejects this assumption and 
holds instead that thoughts are constituted either by what they are about, 
their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition-like in-
tentional contents (provided that these contents are not equated with such 
objects) one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different 
way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on 
two factors: a) what sort of metaphysical nature intentionalia effectively 
possess, once they are conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001; 
2013); b) whether such objects belong to the overall ontological inventory. 
According to this solution, two thoughts are about the same nonexistent 
intentional object iff i) that object satisfies the identity criterion for objects 
of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind belong to the overall 
ontological inventory, independently of whether they exist (in a suitable 
first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither realist nor 
antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about 
the same nonexistent intentionale; otherwise, they are simply constituted 
by the same intentional content (provided that this content is not equated 
with that intentionale). Third, armed with this solution, I will hold that one 
can find a suitable treatment of the specific and related problem of whether 
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different people may mock-think about the same thing, even if there is no 
such thing. Finally, I will try to show that this treatment can be also applied 
to the case in which different thoughts are, according to phenomenology, 
about the same intentionale and yet this intentionale is of a kind such that 
there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are 
about the same intentionale only fictionally.  
2. Intentional identity: the problem  
 From Geach (1980) onwards, a subtle problem has been dogging con-
temporary philosophy of language and mind: how can different people talk 
of and think about the (numerically) same thing, if this thing does not exist? 
In Geach’s notorious example, 
 (1)  Hob believes a witch has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob believes 
that she (the same witch) killed Cob’s sow 
many of us have the intuition that by uttering (1), one intends to talk of the 
same individual, so that (1) amounts to a de re report of different thoughts 
about it. We are therefore tempted to read (1) either strongly as: 
 (1a) ∃α (W(α) ∧ Hob believes that B(α,b) ∧ Nob believes that K(α,c))  
or weakly as: 
 (1b) ∃α (Hob believes that W(α) ∧ B(α,b) ∧ Nob believes that 
K(α,c)). 
Both (1a) and (1b) entail that there is an individual (1) talks of and the 
reported thoughts are about. (1b) is simply a weaker reading than (1a) for 
it does not force one to hold that the individual it talks of is a witch, but 
just that it is believed to be such. Yet how can this entailment be right, if 
the individual in question – the alleged witch – does not exist?2 
                                                          
2  For this elegant way of introducing the problem, see García-Carpintero (2016, 
334). 
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3. The antirealist solutions 
 Clearly enough, if one is a realist tout court about nonexistent things, 
the problem is easily solved. Different thoughts can be about the same non-
existent thing just as other thoughts are about the same thing that straight-
forwardly exists. In this respect, the fact that the former thing, unlike the 
latter thing, does not exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence) 
makes no difference, since the realist is ontologically committed to it as 
well.3 Yet the problem is serious for those who do not believe in nonexist-
ent entities, antirealists. Now, several antirealist answers have been pro-
vided to the question of how different thoughts can be about the same non-
existent ‘item’ – I put this expression within quotes in order to indicate that 
qua antirealists, sustainers of this approach are not ontologically commit-
ted to such a nonexistent thing. Neither of them, however, appears to be 
fully convincing, as the following review will show.  
 To begin with, according to the so-called ‘name-centric’ approach,4 dif-
ferent people think about the same nonexistent ‘item’ insofar as they share 
the same name-using practice involving a certain baptism, though unsuc-
cessful because referentless, and the same communication chain. The nec-
essary condition for that chain is a certain referential intention, i.e., the in-
tention of referring to the same thing, if any, one’s mentors referred to (e.g. 
Donnellan 1974; Taylor 2003; Sainsbury 2005). 
 Clearly enough, in order for this approach to work in the case of (1), 
one must name the nonexistent ‘item’ in question, the alleged witch in that 
case: “Hob believes that a witch, namely [a name follows], …”. Yet this 
clarification notwithstanding, the approach does not seem to work. First of 
all, it fails to provide necessary conditions of intentional identity. As Friend 
(2014) has shown, in thinking e.g. about Santa Claus and about Father 
Christmas, people nowadays clearly think about the same nonexistent 
‘item’. Yet they fail to use the same name (“Santa Claus”, “Father Christ-
mas”). Granted, a supporter of this approach may invoke Mentalese and 
hold that such people mobilize the same Mentalese name. Yet this move 
fares no better. For, adds Friend, those people share no referential intention. 
                                                          
3  For an example of a realist solution, see Salmon (2002), who equates the relevant 
nonexistent thing with an abstract artifact non-spatiotemporally existing. 
4  For this label see Friend (2014, 308). 
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Intending to refer to what one’s mentors originally allegedly referred to by 
“Father Christmas”, a certain personification of Christmas, is not the same 
as intending to refer to what one’s informants originally allegedly referred 
to by “Santa Claus”, an imaginary variant of an ancient bishop; those ref-
erential intentions mobilize different chains (cf. Friend 2014, 315). 
 At this point, fans of name-centrism may bite the bullet and say that in 
this case there is just a sort of intentional match: people nowadays using 
“Father Christmas” no longer want to defer to their mentors’ referential 
acts, they just want to use it as they also use “Santa Claus”. Yet even if this 
move worked, the approach fails to provide sufficient conditions of inten-
tional identity. In thinking about a nonexistent ‘item’, even if one has the 
intention of referring to what her mentors allegedly referred to, she may 
fail to preserve such a reference. Another example by Friend shows this 
point. In writing Hamlet, Shakespeare may have intended to refer by 
“Hamlet” to what Kyd referred to. Yet he failed to refer to what Kyd actu-
ally referred to; namely, a real Danish prince actually named “Amleth” (as 
Friend prompts us to suppose; see Friend 2014, 316). 
 As an alternative antirealist approach, Friend herself has proposed the 
‘info-centric’ approach (see Friend 2014). According to this approach, peo-
ple think about the same nonexistent ‘item’ insofar as they mobilize the 
same network of notions, either because they share the same mental file, a 
certain mental repository of information, or because different such files, 
which may even be labelled differently, suitably overlap, by also being ap-
propriately connected in that notional network. 
 To begin with, appealing to the idea of sharing a notional network rather 
than mere sharing a single file or mere having a file overlap has the ad-
vantage of overcoming a problem that antirealists who simply appeal to 
files’ similarities in order to account for intentional identity unsuccessfully 
face (cf. Crane 2013, 161). The problem consists in the fact that not only 
repository similarity, but also repository identity per se, does not guarantee 
intentional identity.5 Consider indeed the following counterexample to this 
simple account. Intuitively, in their being located in different though quasi-
identical planets, Earth and Twin-Earth, Leverrier and Twin-Leverrier 
think about different nonexistent ‘items’, Vulcan and Twin-Vulcan, even if 
their mental files share the same information (witness the fact that they 
                                                          
5  As Dennett (1968, 337) originally envisaged. 
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would notice nothing if they unconsciously swapped their planetary posi-
tions) and are also labelled the same (“Vulcan”). Now, the supporter of the 
info-centric approach may say that this counterexample to the simple ac-
count hits its target. For, since the Twins are disconnected in their being 
placed in different planets, they share no notional network. 
 Yet sharing the same notional network is again no necessary condition 
of intentional identity. For, as Everett (2013) has pointed out, people may 
think about the same nonexistent ‘item’ even if they do not share the same 
notional network. For example, different people may think about Mrs. Po-
lonius, even if they attend different acts of different performances of Ham-
let in which they grasp different ascribed features of what actually is one 
and the same nonexistent ‘individual’ – say, being Ophelia’s mother, being 
Polonius’ wife (cf. Everett 2013, 96).  
 On behalf of Friend, one may reply that the counterexample is miscon-
ceived. Appearances notwithstanding, those people share the same notional 
network. When no such network is actually shared, the fan of info-centrism 
acknowledges that the situation matches the one her detractor proposes in 
the ‘Mrs. Polonius’ case. Consider another case6 involving two utterly in-
dependent ‘Vulcan’-like baptisms, namely utterly independent baptisms 
mobilizing the same nominal form – “Vulcan” – yet allegedly focused on 
the same nonexistent ‘celestial body’, or anyway two utterly independent 
pointings allegedly ostending the same nonexistent ‘item’. Definitely, in 
this case the baptisms or the pointings share no notional network. Thus, 
appearances notwithstanding, they do not focus on the same ‘target’. Yet 
the ‘Mrs. Polonius’ case is different from this ‘Vulcan’ case, for unlike this 
case the people involved are trapped into the same network. 
 Yet this info-centric reply only prompts the further question of what 
makes two people be members of the same notional network. To begin 
with, a fan of info-centrism must hold that not only causal, but also inten-
tional dependence of one’s file on the relevant files of a practice’s produc-
ers counts on this concern. For mere causal dependence is not enough. 
There may be cases of people thinking about different nonexistent fictional 
‘individuals’ even if their thoughts are causally based either on a thought 
about the same nonexistent fictional ‘individual’ or even on a thought about 
                                                          
6  To reformulate Edelberg’s (1992, 574-575) example. Pace García-Carpintero 
(2016, 342), this case is no counterexample to the info-centric approach. 
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the same concrete individual. Examples of the first kind of situation are 
given by uses of “Holmes” that trace back to Doyle’s original use and nev-
ertheless they are embedded in practices concerning completely different 
fictional ‘Holmeses’ (cf. Pautz 2008, 7). Examples of the second kind of 
situation are given by uses of the same name that trace back to an original 
use in which the name refers to a real individual – say, the very author of a 
certain novel – and nevertheless they are embedded in practices concerning 
completely different fictional ‘individuals’ (cf. García-Carpintero 2016, 
343). 
 Yet if this is the case, then belonging to the same notional network is 
not even sufficient for intentional identity. For, as Friend herself admits, in 
thinking about a nonexistent ‘item’ one can exploit a certain intentional de-
pendence on another file and yet fail to think, by means of her own file, 
about the same ‘item’ the other file focuses on. For example, Flaubert’s 
writing “Madame Bovary c’est moi” shows that his ‘Emma’-file intention-
ally depended on his own ‘I’-file. Yet when writing Madame Bovary, Flau-
bert was obviously thinking about the nonexistent ‘individual’ Emma, not 
about himself (cf. Friend 2014, 324, 329). 
 As we have seen before, pretense may be involved in cases of inten-
tional identity. Indeed, a third option in the antirealist camp is the ‘pretense’ 
approach. As Everett (2013) maintains, people think about the same non-
existent ‘item’ insofar as they belong to the same pretense practice of co-
referring to, or better co-thinking about, the same ‘individual’.  
 This way of putting things allegedly accommodates the aforementioned 
‘Mrs. Polonius’ case. Although different people may attend different acts 
of different performances of Hamlet in which they grasp different ascribed 
features of what actually is one and the same nonexistent ‘individual’, they 
share the same pretense practice of make-believedly referring to, or even 
thinking about, the same ‘individual’.  
 This option immediately prompts a question as to the conditions for be-
ing members of the same pretense practice. On behalf of this approach, one 
may suggest that a condition for the identity of a certain pretense practice 
is the existence of a causal relation between pretend uses of the same ref-
erential term.7 If “referential term” is used here broadly enough, this 
                                                          
7  For this suggestion, which traces back to Evans (1982), Everett (2000), and Kroon 
(2001), cf. Pautz (2008). 
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sounds at least a necessary condition for pretense membership. People in-
volved in the ‘Mrs. Polonius’ pretense practice may not even grasp that the 
same name, “Mrs. Polonius”, is mobilized, yet there is a causal relation 
between them that makes them make-believedly point to the same nonex-
istent ‘individual’ by means of the same demonstrative. The ‘Mrs. Polonius’ 
case suggests that this causal relation is also a sufficient condition, but this 
is controversial. Being causally induced to pretend something by the exist-
ence of a certain pretense practice hardly seems to be enough in order for 
the new practice to be the same as the old practice. Perhaps not even rein-
forcing this requirement with an intentional requirement is enough for be-
ing members of the same pretense practice, for people intending to play the 
same pretense game may be wrong. Probably, identity in story-telling is 
also required (cf. Voltolini 2006, 70-71). 
 Yet this problem notwithstanding, the existence of a shared pretense 
practice is once again not a necessary condition of intentional identity. The 
Geach original case, for one, does not involve pretense (cf. also García-
Carpintero 2016, 346). It is also hardly a sufficient condition. Let me refor-
mulate an aforementioned worry in different terms. Let us suppose that in 
writing Ulysses, Joyce protracted the same kind of pretense that Homer 
initiated. Yet by allegedly pretending that in so writing he was thinking 
(under the different name “Leopold Bloom”, but possibly under the same 
masculine pronoun) about the same thing Homer did (under the name 
“Odysseos”), did Joyce think about the same nonexistent ‘individual’ as 
Homer did?8  
4. Why the antirealist solutions do not work 
 Clearly enough, the above options do not exhaust the possibilities an 
antirealist has of solving the problem of intentional identity. So, it may well 
                                                          
8  García-Carpintero (2016) defends a ‘presuppositional’ approach to intentional iden-
tity that bears some similiarities to the ‘pretense’ approach. For a similar view, see also 
Howell (2015). Being more general than the latter, this approach yields necessary con-
ditions of intentional identity. Yet to my mind it fails to provide sufficient conditions, 
for it unsuccessfully faces the same counterexample as the ‘pretense’ approach. I guess 
that Manning’s (2015) ‘simulationist’ approach suffers from the same problem. 
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be the case that another antirealist option is put forward that does not pre-
sent the same troubles as those presented by the previous options. Yet such 
troubles point to a common general worry that all antirealist solutions, 
whether actual or possible, raise. All of them in fact share the assumption 
that thinking about the same thing involves co-identifying (unsuccessfully, 
in the case of nonexistent ‘items’) the same thing.9 Yet this assumption is 
worrisome. It is clear how to rank together mental arrows of identification 
when they actually and literally point towards the same target, an object 
that is out there. For in this case, in being such a target, that object attracts 
such mental arrows, by letting them somehow depend on it. Yet it is less 
clear how to rank together mental arrows of identification when there ac-
tually is no such target; speaking of arrows (co)-pointing towards some-
thing here seems to be only an obscure metaphor. If we share the Kripkean 
lesson on these matters as applied to thoughts, a descriptivist account of 
that co-identification is ruled out.10 Moreover, any alternative non-descrip-
tivist account seems to be just a rather artificial way of ranking together 
disparate identification practices. In this respect, speaking here of a “com-
mon focus” for the thoughts involved, as Geach did (see Geach 1980, 147), 
merely amounts to putting the cart before the horse, by again trying to 
meaning literally what is just an obscure metaphor, namely speaking of 
thoughts as being codirected. If there literally is no target, how can mental 
arrows be codirected upon ‘it’? 
5. An alternative approach 
 Let me try a different approach that does not share the above problem-
atic assumption. Suppose that, as many externalists say (cf. McDowell 
1994; 1998, McGinn 1989), thinking about something has not to do with 
identifying it, if thinking is instead constituted by that very something, the 
thing that (inter alia) individuates it.  
                                                          
9  As Friend explicitly acknowledges, by talking of the problem of intentional identity 
as a problem of co-identification (see Friend 2014, 308). 
10  For troubles about a descriptivist account of the intentionality of thoughts, cf. Sains-
bury & Tye (2012, chap. 1). Notoriously, Geach himself (1980) rejected a descriptivist 
solution of his puzzle. 
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 In this paper, I cannot argue in favor of this new assumption,11 yet I can 
show its utility for my present purposes. For in virtue of this assumption, I 
can find an alternative solution to the problem of intentional identity. In-
stead of looking for a solution that mobilizes a sort of identity in the think-
ing subjects’ situation, as the antirealist solutions do, I may look for a so-
lution that points to an identity in the objects that are thought-of by such 
subjects, provided that there are any such objects. First, thinking about the 
same thing, even if it does not exist, is guaranteed by i) the fact that it sat-
isfies the metaphysical criterion of identity for that thing – that thing be-
longs to a certain metaphysical kind and things of that kind are identical iff 
(here follows what states the relevant identity criterion) – and ii) the fact 
that there are things of that kind, i.e., that we are ontologically committed 
to such things. For then, given that assumption, the thing in question coin-
dividuates such thoughts. Second, clause ii) has the following conse-
quences. In certain cases, the entity that coindividuates thoughts is pre-
cisely what such thoughts are about according to our phenomenology, i.e., 
to what appears to us,12 sometimes even a nonexistent object of a certain 
kind, for we are ontologically committed to an object of that kind even if 
they do not exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). Yet in other 
cases, the entity that coindividuates thoughts is not what such thoughts are 
about according to our phenomenology, sometimes again a nonexistent ob-
ject of a certain kind, for we are not ontologically committed to that object, 
independently of the fact that it does not exist (again, in a suitable first-
order sense of existence). 
 In order to understand this point better, let me first of all agree with 
Crane’s (2001; 2013) claim that from a metaphysical point of view, i.e., 
from the point of view concerning the nature of the thing of a certain kind 
(provided that there is any such thing), intentional objects, i.e., the objects 
thoughts are about, are schematic objects; that is, that they have no meta-
physical nature insofar as they are thought-of. In other terms, no metaphys-
ical conclusion as to the nature of intentional objects can be drawn from 
                                                          
11  I did it elsewhere: see Sacchi & Voltolini (2012); Voltolini (2015). 
12  This phenomenological appearance may be meant as a second-order belief in the 
aboutness of one’s thought (weak reading) or as a feeling of directedness, leading to a 
phenomenological conception of intentionality itself (strong reading). In this paper, I 
remain neutral on this issue. 
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the fact that thoughts have such objects. It just phenomenologically appears 
to us that they are what our thoughts are about. As Sainsbury (2010) com-
ments, this means that intentionalia are no exotica, that is, they are not 
metaphysically bizarre entities that possess a sui generis metaphysical na-
ture individuating all of them as intentionalia (e.g. Brentanian immanent 
entities, Meinongian entities, and the like).  
 Metaphysically speaking, this claim has a main consequence; namely, 
that intentionalia may have a thought-independent metaphysical nature and 
such a nature may be various. As Crane himself admits, different inten-
tionalia have different thought-independent such natures (cf. Crane 2001, 
17; 2013, 92). Yet the claim has also another yet ontological consequence, 
i.e., a consequence concerning the overall ontological inventory;13 namely, 
that there are just those intentionalia whose thought-independent meta-
physical nature is such that we are ontologically committed to objects of 
that nature. Now, given the previous assumption that a thought is consti-
tuted by what it is about, it further follows that only in that case a thought 
is individuated by its intentionale, for the latter constitutes the former. Oth-
erwise, since a thought cannot be constituted by an intentionale if there is 
no such object, not only it is not really about such an object, but it is also 
individuated by the other things that actually constitute it. Such things de-
termine for it a proposition-like intentional content, the semantically rele-
vant element it turns out to involve; quite likely, a general content of the 
kind, there is a (unique) F that Gs.14 In this case, properly speaking there 
is no intentionale for two thoughts that merely share their intentional con-
tent. These thoughts just think the same insofar as they are constituted by 
the same intentional content, provided of course again that one has a suit-
able criterion of identity for that content. Since that content is proposition-
                                                          
13  For this conception of the relationship between metaphysics and ontology cf. e.g. 
Thomasson (1999). 
14  Since Crane does not endorse a conception of thoughts as being constituted by their 
intentionalia, he does not endorse this ontological consequence either. For him (see 
Crane 2001, 2013), thoughts are always about their intentionalia, independently of 
whether such intentionalia figure in the overall ontological inventory. Whereas for me, 
thought are about intentionalia just in case they figure in that inventory. As a further 
consequence, for Crane aboutness is a nonrelational property of thoughts, whereas for 
me it is a relational property of them. I have criticized Crane’s approach elsewhere; see 
Voltolini (2009; 2013). 
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like, in order to assess that two thoughts think the same one will have to 
resort to one’s favorite theory of propositions. 
 In order to clarify this issue, let me start by providing some examples. 
First, in reflecting on Elizabeth II, one may think both about her Majesty 
and about the number Two, as phenomenology tells one: it appears to one 
that one’s thoughts are respectively about them. Both objects are inten-
tionalia in a schematic sense: they have no metaphysical nature insofar as 
they are what those thoughts are about. They do have a thought-independ-
ent metaphysical nature, yet that nature is utterly different: her Majesty is 
a concrete entity (notably, a person), number Two is an abstract entity (no-
tably, a number). Suppose also that in the overall ontological inventory 
there are not only concreta, persons in particular, for ontological skepti-
cism about them seems to be self-defeating, but also abstracta, numbers in 
particular, as many of us are disposed to believe by relying e.g. on some 
indispensability argument. Thus, we are ontologically committed to both 
these intentionalia. Given the new assumption about constitution, both in-
tentionalia respectively individuate our thoughts.  
 Yet second, in reflecting on Elizabeth II, one may think both about her 
Majesty and about her entelecheia, i.e., her teleological end or perfection, 
as phenomenology again tells one. Both objects are again intentionalia in 
a schematic sense. Yet their thought-independent nature is different: as we 
have already seen, her Majesty is a concrete entity (a person), yet her en-
telecheia is a (false) nonnatural posit endowed with causal powers insofar 
as it allegedly guides an organism’s development. As we have seen, more-
over, we accept persons in the overall ontological inventory. Yet we nor-
mally agree in rejecting non-natural posits endowed with causal powers, 
hence entelecheias as well. Thus, in the light of the new assumption about 
constitution, while Elizabeth II individuates the thought that according to 
phenomenology – correctly – is about her, her entelechia does not individ-
uate the thought that according to phenomenology – incorrectly – is about 
it. Another entity indeed plays that job – plausibly, a proposition-like en-
telecheian intentional content, a content displaying the problematic deter-
minations that makes entelecheias ontologically implausible.15 
                                                          
15  In (2001, 30), Crane defended a similar strategy as to intentional content, but for 
the fact that for him that content is nonconceptual, hence nonpropositional. This may 
depend on the fact that in his strategy (see Crane 2001; 2013), nonexistent intentionalia 
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 Once the above is the case, moreover, as to intentional identity I can 
say that our thoughts are coindividuated by the intentionale they share, just 
in case we are ontologically committed to objects with the specific nature 
of such intentionale, even if that nature makes them to be nonexistent en-
tities, in a suitable first-order sense of existence. Otherwise, those thoughts 
are still coindividuated, yet not by their alleged intentionale of a certain 
nature, for there really is no such thing, but by entities of a different kind. 
More precisely, two thoughts are individuated by the same object they are 
about, just as phenomenology conveys to one, iff: i) the object the first 
thought thinks about according to one’s phenomenology and the object the 
second thought thinks about according to one’s phenomenology are meta-
physically the same object; ii) there really is such an object. If there is no 
such object, then they are not really about it. Thus, although as to them 
there is no proper intentional identity, they are coindividuated by another 
kind of thing that there is; namely, what determines their proposition-like 
identical intentional content. Both thoughts indeed mobilize a content of 
the kind, there is a (unique) F that Gs. 
 Once again, let me clarify matters by means of examples. Let me start 
with three hopefully uncontroversial cases. To begin with, suppose Jules is 
thinking about the set of the cordates and Jim is thinking about the set of 
the renates, as phenomenology respectively tells them. Do they really think 
about the same thing? Metaphysically speaking, first, the things that ac-
cording to their phenomenology the two guys are thinking about are ab-
stracta of a certain kind; namely, sets. Second, as is well known, sets have 
the following identity criterion: {x: Fx} = {x: Gx} iff ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx). Ac-
cording to this criterion, the set of the cordates and the set of the renates 
are the same set, for they are coextensional. Ontologically speaking, more-
over, there are sets, or so most of us believe, for sets merely supervene on 
                                                          
never figure in the overall ontological inventory. Whereas I hold that the question of 
whether nonexistent intentionalia figure in that inventory is a case by case question, to 
be answered differently depending on whether the different kinds of nonexistent inten-
tionalia that are at stake are accepted in that inventory – positively as to ficta and mere 
possibilia, negatively as to impossibilia. In a nutshell, in the positive case, instead of 
having a nonconceptual content we have a nonexistent intentional object that figures in 
the overall ontological domain, while in the negative case, since there is no such object, 
plausibly enough the intentional content one’s thought possesses in that case is propo-
sitionally structured. 
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their members. Hence, Jules and Jim really think about the same thing, i.e., 
the very set that coindividuates their thoughts.  
 Mutatis mutandis, a similar story must be told as to thinking about 
numbers or about any other abstracta. In thinking about 2 and about II, 
as phenomenology respectively tells them, Jules and Jim are respectively 
thinking about the same thing that individuates both thoughts, i.e., a cer-
tain number, provided that: i) 2 and II are the same according to the iden-
tity criterion for numbers; ii) there are numbers (as we already acknowl-
edged). 
 Finally, do Jules and Jim really think about the same thing when Jules 
is thinking about Elizabeth II and Jim is thinking about that lady over there 
(he is actually facing her Majesty), as their phenomenology respectively 
tells them? Metaphysically speaking, first, the things that according to their 
phenomenology the two guys are thinking about are things belonging to 
concreta, namely, things that may be spatiotemporal occupiers.16 Second, 
concreta have the following identity criterion: a and b are the same con-
cretum iff, in all worlds in which they exist, they have the same spatiotem-
poral profile. 17 According to this criterion, Elizabeth II and that lady are 
the same concretum. Ontologically speaking, moreover, there are concreta, 
as we have already acknowledged. Hence, Jules and Jim really think about 
the same thing, which coindividuates their thoughts. 
 Armed with these reflections, let me pass to scrutinize the controversial 
cases. First, suppose Jules is thinking about Sherlock and Jim is thinking 
about Holmes, as phenomenology respectively tells them. Do they really 
think about the same thing? Metaphysically speaking, first, the things that 
according to their phenomenology the two guys are thinking about are 
things belonging, if artefactualists about fictional characters are right,18 to 
a particular kind of abstracta; namely, ficta, taken as abstract artefacts. 
Second, one may suppose that ficta have a precise identity criterion.  
For instance, one may say that a and b are the same fictum iff they share 
the same set of properties attributed to them in stories and they come out 
of the same make-believe process of a certain kind that there is a certain 
                                                          
16  For this conception, cf. Cocchiarella (1982). See also Priest (2016). 
17  For this conception, see Cocchiarella (1982). 
18  See paradigmatically Thomasson (1999). 
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individual.19 According to this criterion, Sherlock and Holmes are the same 
fictum. Suppose further that we agree that there are ficta, for instance be-
cause dispensing with them is false parsimony, or because they are indis-
pensable (dispensing with them entails dispensing with other entities we 
independently admit).20 Granted, qua fictum, Sherlock aka Holmes does 
not exist. Yet since qua fictum it belongs to the overall ontological inven-
tory, the fact that it does not exist, in a suitable first-order sense of exist-
ence, does not prevent Jules and Jim from really thinking about the same 
thing, which coindividuates their thoughts.  
 Second, suppose Jules is hallucinating Nessie and Jim is hallucinating 
that monster over there, as phenomenology respectively tells them. 
Granted, it may not appear to them that they are hallucinating, yet it ap-
pears respectively to them that their mental states are about Nessie and 
that monster. Do they really think of the same thing? Metaphysically 
speaking, first, the things that according to their phenomenology the two 
guys are thinking about are things that might have existed even if they do 
not exist (again in a suitable first-order sense of existence): mere possi-
bilia. Hence again, they are allegedly thinking about things belonging to 
concreta, namely, things that may be spatiotemporal occupiers. Second, 
as we saw before, concreta have the following identity criterion: a and b 
are the same concretum iff, in all worlds in which they exist, they have 
the same spatiotemporal profile.21 According to this criterion, if they share 
that profile in all worlds in which they exist, Nessie and that monster are 
the same concretum; namely, a certain mere possibile. Suppose further 
that we agree that in the overall ontological domain there are not only 
concreta, but also mere possibilia. For dispensing with mere possibilia 
would be false parsimony insofar as they are of the same metaphysical 
kind as actual possibilia (like Elizabeth II) that we already admit (cf. 
Lewis 1986; Voltolini 2007). Now granted, that mere possibile does not 
                                                          
19  See Voltolini (2006). Caplan and Muller (2015) hold that ficta satisfy no criterion 
of identity: they are brutally identical. One may accept that basic entities satisfy no such 
criterion. Yet, as Caplan, Muller & Sanson (2017) admit, if ficta were no basic entities 
(as is probably the case), such a satisfaction would obtain. 
20  For these arguments, cf. Thomasson (1999) and Voltolini (2006) respectively. 
21  For a similar identity criterion for mere possibilia cf. Zalta (1983, 75). 
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exist. Yet since qua possibile it belongs to the overall ontological inven-
tory, the fact that it does not exist, in a suitable first-order sense of exist-
ence, does not prevent Jules and Jim from really thinking about the same 
thing, which coindividuates their thoughts.22 
 To be sure, one might object that one can hardly apply this criterion 
to concrete cases involving mere possibilia, since qua mere possibilia 
Nessie and that monster have actually just a few properties among those 
that are predicated of them. Indeed, they lack all the so-called existence-
entailing properties (cf. again Cocchiarella 1982). Neither Nessie nor that 
monster, for example, actually swims in Loch Ness, has a shiny skin, and 
attacks boats; they have such properties only in the merely possible 
worlds where they exist. So, how can one settle whether they are the same 
or not? 
 Yet the objector forgets that among the existence-entailing properties 
that are falsely ascribed at one and the same time to Nessie and that mon-
ster, there are also spatiotemporal properties, which are the properties mo-
bilized in the identity criterion for mere possibilia. Now, if contrary to the 
above hypothesis, in the closest merely possible world where both exist, 
Nessie and that monster do not share such properties, then they are different 
entities. Suppose that, while facing Loch Ness, I hallucinate Nessie to be 
here while you hallucinate that monster to be there. This means that, in the 
closest merely possible world where both exist, Nessie has a certain spati-
otemporal profile while that monster has another one. Hence, they are dif-
ferent entities. This is surely the case of the aforementioned Vulcan and 
Twin-Vulcan, which in the closest merely possible world where both exist 
have a spatiotemporally utterly different orbit.23 
 Third, suppose Jules is thinking about Twardy, the wooden cannon 
made of steel, and Jim is thinking about Cazmy, the steel cannon made of 
wood, as phenomenology respectively tells them. Do they really think 
about the same thing? Metaphysically speaking, first, the things that ac-
cording to their phenomenology the two guys are thinking about belong to 
impossible objects. Second, impossibilia have the following identity crite-
rion: a and b are the same impossibile iff, in the impossible worlds in which 
                                                          
22  For similar views, see Glick (2012) and Pagin (2014).  
23  Thus pace Dennett (1968, 337), Jules and Jim do not have to share all their beliefs 
on a certain subject, but just the relevant spatiotemporal beliefs. 
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they exist, they share all their properties. According to this criterion, 
Twardy and Cazmy are the same impossibile. Yet ontologically speaking, 
as most people think, in the overall ontological domain there are no impos-
sibilia, independently of the fact that they do not exist (actually, they can-
not exist) in a suitable first-order sense of existence. For even allowing for 
impossible worlds24 does not suffice for allowing for such things: impos-
sible worlds are just one kind of impossible entities, impossible objects are 
another one. If this is the case, then their phenomenology notwithstanding, 
Jules and Jim are not really thinking about the same intentionale. Properly 
speaking, therefore, as to their thoughts there is no intentional identity. Yet 
they still think the same, for something else really (co)individuates such 
thoughts, i.e., something that really figures in the overall ontological in-
ventory; possibly, a certain Twardian/Cazmyan propositional-like inten-
tional content to the effect that there is a certain cannon that is both made 
of steel and made of wood. 
 This last case is very important. For as to impossibilia, a certain25 
amount of consensus holds as to the fact that an antirealist account must be 
adopted wrt a problem of intentional identity. Different people here think 
the same, yet this sameness has not to do with the kind of thing they seem 
to be thinking about, an impossibile, for in point of fact there is no thing of 
that kind.  
 Now, this antirealist account may be exported as to any intentionale of 
another kind for which it turned out that an antirealist approach is correct, 
for there is no such kind. Thus, not only if it were right not to believe in 
ficta and in mere possibilia, but also if it were right not to believe in sets, 
numbers and any other abstracta, a similar antirealist story as to the prob-
lem of intentional identity should be told in all such cases. Nevertheless, it 
remains that whatever cases support an antirealist stance, the relevant 
thoughts think the same thing not because they co-identify something, as 
antirealists traditionally believe (see the previous Section), but because 
they are constituted by the same ontologically relevant stuff. Simply, that 
stuff is not the thing is one is thinking about according to one’s phenome-
nology, for there really is no such thing. 
                                                          
24  As Priest (2016), Yagisawa (2008), and Berto (2012) do. 
25  Admittedly, a limited one: Impossibilists and Meinongians of any sort would disa-
gree. 
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 If this is the case, then a general solution to the problem of intentional 
identity can be found. First, one must check the nature of the entities people 
really think about when they are entertaining certain thoughts, insofar as 
by being really there in the overall ontological inventory, such entities con-
stitute those thoughts. Second, if such entities are metaphysically identical, 
then those thoughts are really about the same thing, even if its having that 
very nature forces that thing not to exist, in a suitable first-order sense of 
existence. Third, if the things people seem to be thinking about are not re-
ally there in the overall ontological inventory, then their thoughts are not 
about the same intentionale, yet they may still be thoughts involving the 
same entities, i.e., what really constitutes such thoughts instead of that in-
tentionale: a certain proposition-like intentional content. 
 This solution is neither realist nor antirealist in general. According to 
it, different thoughts can be about the same nonexistent object only if that 
object belongs to a kind such that there are things of that kind in the overall 
ontological inventory. 
 At this point, one may arise the following doubt. Since by following 
Crane I said that, qua object of one’s thought, an intentionale has no meta-
physical nature, what prevents one in the problematic cases from not onto-
logically dispensing with that intentionale, by metaphysically identifying it 
with an intentional content that really belongs to the overall ontological 
inventory? Thus, one might apply also to these cases the positive solution 
I have proposed for the problem of intentional identity. E.g. as to impossi-
bilia, what prevents one from ontologically allowing for the relevant inten-
tionale, by metaphysically identifying it not with an object that cannot ex-
ist, but with the relevant intentional content – a content that is impossible 
to satisfy – that is really there, so as to say that the relevant thoughts are 
really both about that content? 
 To be sure, such a move would save the intuition that intentionality is 
uniform, so that the thought’s aboutness is to be taken at face value: when-
ever it seems to one that one’s thought is about something, that thought is 
really so.26 For there really is something that thought is about, simply its 
metaphysical nature is not the kind of nature one would have expected. E.g. 
in the case of impossibilia, whenever it seems to one that one is thinking 
about something, there really is something one’s thought is about, yet it is 
                                                          
26  On this intuition, cf. e.g. Spinelli (2016, 94). 
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not an impossible object but an ontologically palatable intentional content 
that is simply impossible to satisfy. 
 Yet unfortunately, there is a reason for not utterly endorsing such a wel-
come result.27 In some cases, people seem to think about different objects. 
But if what they think about were intentional contents, it might implausibly 
turn out that they are thinking about the same entity. For instance, suppose 
that Jules seems to think about the set of sets that are not members of them-
selves, whereas Jim seems to think about the property of being a property 
that does not apply to itself. Intuitively, they seem to think about different 
things. Yet suppose one claimed that what they really think about are in-
tentional contents and, owing to one’s particular theory of propositions, 
such intentional contents are the same proposition. This would mean that, 
appearances notwithstanding, they are thinking of the same intentionale. 
Now, it may well be the case that phenomenology fails to be a good guide 
to metaphysics. One may believe that what one is thinking is an object of 
a certain metaphysical kind, whereas in point of fact it is an object of an-
other metaphysical kind. Consider e.g. children’s thinking of Santa Claus, 
who they assume to be a concrete entity whereas in point of fact it is a kind 
of fictional entity, a mythological entity. Yet phenomenology is a reliable 
guide to metaphysics at least as to the number of objects, if any, that are 
involved by one’s thoughts. Now, in the case at issue one phenomenologi-
cally counts two objects – the paradoxical set and the paradoxical property 
– where metaphysically speaking just one entity would be at stake, a certain 
proposition. This suggests that in that case at least, it is better not to identify 
intentional objects with intentional contents, while going on saying that, 
since the alleged intentional object does not really figure in the overall on-
tological domain, instead of having that object, one’s thought merely has 
an intentional content. 
 To complete the picture, let me conclude this section by saying that 
settling the kind of entity involved and its metaphysical relationship with 
the qualifying properties that are predicated of it also determines the kind 
of de re report of intentional identity that is true of it just in case that 
entity really belongs to the overall ontological inventory. As we saw be-
fore, reports like (1) can be read either in a strong or in a weak form, 
precisely depending on whether the entity they allegedly truly quantify 
                                                          
27  In the final section, we will see that there is a partial way of endorsing it. 
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over possesses the property ascribed to it in the relevant report. Since 
ficta, if there are any, actually possess the properties that are predicated 
of them within stories, the kind of de re reports that turn out to be true of 
them is of the (1a)-form, the strong reading. For instance, we can truly 
read: 
 (2)  Magica De Spell is a witch such that Hob believes that she hates 
Uncle Scrooge, whereas Nob believes that she likes Donald 
Duck 
as: 
 (2a) ∃α(W(α) ∧ Hob believes that H(α,U) ∧ Nob believes that 
L(α,D)). 
For Magica De Spell is a fictum that actually possesses the property of 
being a witch predicated of her in the Disney stories. Yet since mere pos-
sibilia, if there are any, do not actually possess the existence-entailing 
properties ascribed to them in the thoughts about them, the kind of de re 
reports that turn out to be true of them is of the (1b)-form, the weak read-
ing. We can truly read (1), which is about a merely possible witch, merely 
as (1b). 
6. How one can mock-think about the same thing,  
and a final consequence 
 On the basis of the above solution to the general problem of intentional 
identity, I can also provide a treatment of the particular problem of how in 
pretense one can think about the same thing, when in the overall ontologi-
cal inventory there is no such thing. Once I endorse the above solution to 
the problem of intentional identity, this further problem becomes just a spe-
cific yet related problem, whose treatment provides no solution to the gen-
eral problem of intentional identity, yet it may shed light to the above so-
lution itself by integrating it. 
 To begin with, as Evans (1982) and Walton (1990) have shown us, pre-
tense involves two forms of as-if activity. Of certain things that are there, 
one can make as if they had certain properties. But one can also make as if 
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there were things of certain kinds having certain properties, even if there 
are no such things.28 Now, in so pretending that there are such things, one’s 
thoughts about them are also pretended thoughts. Following Evans’ termi-
nology, let me call them mock-thoughts. Mock-thoughts are therefore to be 
distinguished from thoughts that are about nonexistent things, in a suitable 
first-order sense of existence. For unlike the latter things, the former things 
do not utterly figure in the overall ontological domain; in one’s mock-
thought, one merely pretends that such things figure in that domain.29 
 Now, in the light of the above solution of the problem of intentional 
identity, it is easy to say when two mock-thoughts are mock-thoughts about 
the same thing, by thus pretending to be about the same thing even if there 
is no such thing. In such mock-thoughts, one must not only pretend that 
there are certain things, but also that they are things of a certain kind, 
thereby pretending to satisfy an identity criterion for things of that kind. 
No identity in the kind of pretense one is engaged in is required any longer, 
as it was the case in the ‘pretense’ antirealist approach to the problem of 
intentional identity we saw in Section 3. For even if such kinds of pretense 
differ, the identity criterion people are pretending to adopt for the kind of 
things they mock-think about suffices for those mock-thoughts to be about 
the same thing. 
 Let me illustrate this point again by means of examples. First, in their 
respective pretend plays, Homer mock-thought about Odysseus and Dante 
mock-thought about Ulysses. Clearly enough, those plays did not by them-
selves affect the overall ontological inventory. Homer just pretended that 
there was such a thing as Odysseus, while Dante just pretended that there 
was such a thing as Ulysses. Nevertheless, did they mock-think about the 
same thing? Both pretended not only that there is a certain thing, but also 
that such a thing is both a concretum and satisfies the identity criteria for 
                                                          
28  The two forms of pretense respectively occur in what Evans (1982) calls conserva-
tive and creative make-believe games. The former correspond in part to Walton’s (1993) 
prop-oriented make-believe games. 
29  Mock-thoughts may even be unintentional, in the sense that one may not realize 
that one’s mental activity merely amounts to a mock-thought. For those who reject 
fictional entities and think that in fiction one merely pretend that there are certain 
things, the Santa Claus case (along with all myth-involving cases) may be reinter-
preted as a case in which children inadvertently pretend that there is a guy who does 
such and such. 
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concreta. If they had not pretended the latter at least implicitly, they would 
have rather pretended that such a thing is an impossible entity having in-
compatible determinations. But in their plays there is no sign of that form 
of pretense. Now, as we already know, two things are the same concretum 
iff they share the same spatiotemporal profile in all worlds in which they 
exist. Hence, two things are pretended to be the same concretum iff they 
are pretended to share that spatiotemporal profile. As a matter of fact, the 
pretended spatiotemporal profile of what Homer and Dante mock-thought 
is the same. Dante simply reprises Homer’s narration by adding new 
events that involve Ulysses after his return home. Once he started navi-
gating again, Ulysses bypasses the Hercules’ pillars and eventually dies 
in the Southern hemisphere. Hence, both Homer and Dante mock-thought 
about the same thing. By the same reasoning, one may show that (Joyce’s 
intentions notwithstanding) Homer and Joyce did not mock-think about 
the same thing. For obviously enough, Odysseus’ pretended spatiotem-
poral profile and Bloom’s pretended spatiotemporal profile do not coin-
cide. 
 Second, Hamlet notoriously contains a play within a play, The Murder 
of Gonzago. In Hamlet’s nesting play, Shakespeare pretends that Gonzago, 
the hero of the nested play, is a fictional character. Granted, we know very 
little about Kyd’s Ur-Hamlet. Yet let me suppose, for argument’s sake, that 
it also contained a play within a play whose hero is Ur-Gonzago, let me 
call it The Murder of Ur-Gonzago. So in Ur-Hamlet’s nesting play, Kyd 
pretends that Ur-Gonzago is a fictional character. Do they mock-think 
about the same thing? Well, the mock-thoughts featuring the nesting plays 
involve fictional characters coming out of the nested plays (unlike mock-
thoughts that would feature the nested plays, which just involve concrete 
individuals: in the above nested plays, The Murder of Gonzago and The 
Murder of Ur-Gonzago, both Gonzago and Ur-Gonzago are men, not fic-
tional characters). Thus, both Shakespeare and Kyd pretend that there is a 
certain thing, that such a thing is a fictum and (at least implicitly) that it 
satisfies the identity criteria for ficta. As we have seen before, one may 
provide various identity criteria for ficta. For instance, one may say that 
two things are the same fictum iff they share the same set of properties 
attributed to them in stories and they come out of the same make-believe 
process that there is a certain individual. Hence, two things are pretended 
to be the same fictum iff they are pretended to share that very set and their 
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process of generation. As a result, one may show that (Shakespeare’s in-
tentions notwithstanding?) Shakespeare and Kyd do not mock-think about 
the same fictional character. For, since Ur-Hamlet does not coincide with 
Hamlet, either the properties respectively mock-attributed to Gonzago and 
Ur-Gonzago in their nesting plays or the respective mock-generation pro-
cesses in those plays plausibly differ. 
 At this point, on the basis of this treatment, I may supply the general 
solution I have put forward to the problem of intentional identity with an 
additional fictionalist account. This account holds just for the cases in 
which there really are no intentionalia figuring as the relevant thoughts’ 
constituents, for in the overall ontological domain there really are no things 
of the metaphysical kinds such intentionalia belong to. I may indeed say 
that in such cases, while it is still really the case that the relevant thoughts 
think the same insofar as they are constituted by the same proposition-like 
intentional content, it is just a shallow pretense that such thoughts are about 
the same intentionale, as phenomenology suggests. As one may put it, what 
is phenomenologically the case is in such cases just what it is fictionally 
the case. 
 This way of putting things has an additional advantage. For it partially 
saves the uniformity intuition we considered in the previous Section that, 
in a sense, both thoughts that in my account are constituted by intentionalia 
and thoughts not so constituted are about something. For the former are 
such that they are really about something, yet the latter are such that they 
are merely fictionally about something. 
 Cases in which different thoughts are allegedly about the same impos-
sibile are paradigmatic instances of this situation. Coming back to a previ-
ous example, when allegedly thinking about Twardy and Cazmy respec-
tively, it is just fictionally the case that Jules and Jim think about the same 
impossibile, as phenomenology suggests. For it is instead really the case 
that they are both mobilizing in their thoughts a certain Twardian/Cazmyan 
proposition-like intentional content. Clearly enough, such cases definitely 
are not the only cases of this kind (situations involving thoughts allegedly 
about imaginary companions, idiosyncratic posits, indeterminate fictional 
characters are other clear instances).30 
                                                          
30  For these examples, see Kroon (2011; 2013; 2015). 
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